Key Poker Hands

While you might want nothing more than to forget your latest bad beat or bust-out, taking time to review key hands after the event is vital for improving your game. This month I’ve reviewed a selection of key hands from deep-stacked live tourneys, with blow-by-blow analysis of the play as it unfolds. Some I win, some I lose, some I play well and some I don’t. But each presents some interesting decisions and should help illuminate some aspect of no-limit tournament strategy.

Hand 1: GUKPT Grand Final 2008

I’d flopped set under set in the first level of this event but had thankfully been let off by some extremely passive play by my opponent, and had been able to chip back up to around the starting stack. Ben Grundy was on the table and the only other person I recognised was David Lloyd, sitting to my direct left. This hand occurred at the start of the fourth level.

Picking up pocket Queens under the gun I decided just to limp (blinds 100/200), primarily because there had been a few active players on the table but also because it’s important to mix up your play. For many players, limping UTG is an immediate sign of a big hand, but I can count on one hand the number of times I have ever limped with a big hand UTG. I felt that limping here would add a really good dynamic and hopefully catch someone off guard. Next to act was David Lloyd, who immediately raised to 800. The action then passed all the way back to me. David is quite an active player and had been playing lots of pots. He is also a thinking player and someone I have played with quite a bit before. I knew he wouldn’t suspect me for a big hand. I also know that one of the worst things you can do after limping a big hand in the early stages of a tournament is to re-raise when action is already going to be heads-up. If you’re going to do that why not just flip your hand up and save everyone some time. Of course, if any other players had called the situation would have been different and I’d have been forced to raise.

The flop came a glorious 2-Q-2. I checked and Lloyd bet 1,300. At this point, I needed to plan how I could possibly get all the chips in the middle. Pre-flop, I had him on a wide range of hands, most of which would not have hit this board. It would be hard for him to continue without A-A/K-K or A-Q if I check-raised this dry flop, and his range was certainly wider than that. I therefore opted to dwell up and call. I was trying to convince him that I had limped with a small/medium pocket pair and was calling his flop bet to see if he was in fact just taking a stab at the pot.

Gathering Evidence
The turn card was a 10. I checked and Lloyd bet again, 2,800 into 4,500. He changed his bet size quite a few times before settling on this amount and I was able to get quite a bit of information to help me deduce his hand. There were lots of hands in his range that he would have checked behind on the turn for pot control. All pocket pairs, Jacks and below would check the turn.

The reasons for this are as follows: as there are no draws out, I must either have a smaller pocket pair, in which case he is way ahead and I have very few outs to outdraw him, or I have a Queen or even a deuce, in which case he is way behind and doesn’t want to get any more money in the pot. He also knew that if I did have a pocket pair I was unlikely to call bets on both the turn and the river, so his best play was to check behind on the turn and re-evaluate on the river.

The fact that he chose to bet meant one of two things. Either he had a hand with no showdown value and was firing a second bullet to get me off a marginal hand, or he had a hand like A-Q or better (A-A/K-K) and was hoping to get value from a worse Queen. His bet sizing of 2,800 into 4,500 felt more like a value bet than an attempt to push me off the pot and his mannerisms suggested he had a hand.

So, if he does have a big hand, what’s the best way to get the remaining money into the pot? If I call there will be 11,000 in the pot and we would both have around 12,000 behind. If I check-raise all-in on the turn it will be for about a pot-sized bet. Would he feel sufficiently committed to call off the rest of his stack? I could check-raise for a smaller amount but that would show such strength that I’m not sure he could put me on a worse hand. I decided that if I just called, there were virtually no danger cards that could fall on the river that would stop him from betting again for value. Say you held Aces and the board ran out Q-2-2-10-7 and a guy had check-called you on two streets, would you bet again on the river? Of course! You almost certainly have to be winning. This is what I did, and the river came an 8. I checked and David bet 3,800. A smaller bet than I had hoped but at least he didn’t check! I opted to check-raise all-in almost instantly. I didn’t give it too much Hollywood but tried to let him think I was making a move. It’s very hard for the line I have taken to be a bluff but at least I maximised the number of chips I could win. David tanked for a long time before folding pocket Aces.

Could I have gotten all the money in by playing my hand faster on flop or turn? I think I maintained the notion that I was calling down with a weaker hand for as long as possible, and if I’d have check-raised the turn I think the game would have been up there and then. Of course, with hindsight I can see that if I’d put in a large check-raise on the flop there is no way David could have passed, but at that stage I didn’t know he had Aces. Being able to re-evaluate the hand and your opponent’s range down the streets is key to maximising value.

Hand 2: Amsterdam Master Classics 2008

At the start of day two of this tournament I was almost exactly average on just over 68k. I managed to win a couple of good small pots to get off to a decent start and then the following key hand came up.
The blinds were 700/1,400/a300 and the action was folded to me in the small blind. The big blind was Swedish pro Mikael Norinder who was the tournament chip leader. I’d just beaten him in a couple of small pots which hadn’t gone to showdown.

I decided to raise to 4k with Ad-9d and he called, as he almost always does. The flop came down 2-3-9 rainbow. I knew Norinder was very aggressive, especially in a blind war, so I checked to him, feeling confident I had the best hand and deciding to give him some rope. He bet out 6k and I chose to just call. I could have raised, but on such a dry flop I would have forced all worse hands to fold. The main problem with calling is that my hand was still quite vulnerable, but I felt he was on a complete bluff and probably didn’t even have two overcards.

The turn came an 8, I checked again and this time he bet 16k – a very chunky bet. With around 60k left in my stack I now had two options. I could check-raise all-in or I could call and check-call again on the river. I’d say I rated my chances of being ahead as around 90%. Obviously the pot was big now and an all-in would win me the pot unless he did somehow have me beaten. I felt like if he did have nothing, he would definitely bet again on the river, maybe even setting me all-in (which I would definitely call). I decided to just call the 16k and give him a chance to bluff again on the river, which would also stop me from going broke if I was beaten. I called and the river was a King which obviously is not a great card for me. I checked and he bet 16k again.

This was a pretty horrible river bet to be faced with, as I was expecting a much bigger bet. The bet sizing now felt like I was beaten and was not really consistent with the bets on previous streets. A hand like K-9 may appear to make sense although most players would try to control the pot on the turn more with this type of hand. I was getting laid a very good price on the call and I had really under-represented my hand. I made a crying call on the river and was shown K-2 for a rivered two-pair.

In hindsight, the check-raise all-in on the turn appears to be the best play. However, it felt like my opponent had nothing (in fact he was semi-bluffing with bottom pair) and knowing his aggressive nature I was attempting to maximise value from my hand in the knowledge that he very likely had few outs on the river. Sure there would be many scare cards that could fall, but not many of these would hit his hand and yet I felt confident he would probably bet them all. I could possibly have folded on the river given the bet sizing, but my plan on the turn was to check-call pretty much any river card and I was relatively unlucky that he managed to hit his card.

Hand 3: GUKPT London 2008

I arrived 30 minutes late for this tournament and the following hand came up on only the second hand I was dealt. With the blinds at 25/50 I found J-J in late position. There was one limper in mid-position and then Roberto Romanello limped in the seat to my right. I raised to 300 (with a 10k stack) and the action folded back to the first limper, high-stakes cash player Anu Sareen, who said, ‘I’ll give you a spin.’

Roberto then accidentally exposed one of his cards – a 5, and made it quite obvious he was limping with a pair. He passed, only to see the flop come 5c-8c-6s. Sareen checked, I made a standard bet of around 600 and Sareen quickly check-raised to 1,600. The pre-flop action here strongly suggests that I started with the best hand – a bigger pair was unlikely after he had limp-called my raise, possibly allowing Roberto in behind him. Pocket nines or tens were a possibility, but again his play would be relatively unconventional with these hands. How about a set? We could obviously rule out 5-5 but 8-8 or 6-6 would fit the bill. 8-6 maybe? 7-9 for a flopped straight? A flush draw? My opponent was relatively unknown to me and I didn’t know if he was likely to overplay top pair or to fast-play his drawing hands. I did have position though and decided to peel one off.

The turn card was the 8h. My opponent now quickly fired 2,500. The manner of his bet enabled me to rule out several holdings. He was definitely not making this bet with Quad eights or sixes full, as 99% of players would at least dwell before making any sort of bet with these hands. And that’s if they can convince themselves not to check. I also ruled out 8-6 for the same reason. So what was I losing to? I couldn’t think of much – I now put him on nines, tens or a club draw and I wasn’t sure why he’d be wanting to go broke so eagerly with nines or tens. I decided to call the 2,500, still convinced I was winning but slightly baffled as to what my opponent was up to.

The river card came 9d. My opponent quickly moved all-in. I had 6k left behind. I was left with a tough decision – the club draw had missed, and he still wasn’t betting his hand like someone who had turned a full house and wanted to get paid. Any 7 did now make a straight but what 7 did he have and why was he betting so heavily when I could be slow-playing a full house? Pocket nines had just spiked a miracle card but would he bet the turn so heavily?

After some thought I decided to pass. His mannerisms were giving off strength despite the fact that I still couldn’t work out what he had and 6k was more than enough to come back from at this early stage. While his range appeared weighted to his drawing hands, and most of those had missed, I still had significant doubts now that my hand was good. Often at the early stages of a tournament, especially on a new table and with unfamiliar opponents, it is better to bide your time, give yourself chance to observe and look for tendencies in your opponents. Maybe for this reason I could have found a pass on the turn. After I passed my hand my opponent was kind enough to show his. Figuring he was about to show me a bluff, I was relieved to see the Jc-7c for the combo draw which rivered a straight.

Hand 4: PokerStars Caribbean Adventure $ 3,000 event 2008

This tournament saw one of the strangest opening hands I’ve ever played. It involved Matthew Perry aka Chandler from Friends, who limp-called my pre-flop raise from early position with Q-3 offsuit and proceeded to fire all three barrels.

But in this hand a young active player raised under the gun to 425 with blinds at 75/150. Andrew Teng, a very good aggressive young player re-raised to 1,100 UTG+1. Action passed to Chandler on the button who called. I was in the small blind with 10c-10s. After originally intending to pass I decided to call from my stack of 12k to try to flop a 10. The big blind passed and the UTG player called the re-raise. The flop came down 9d-8d-3s. I checked, UTG checked, Andrew checked and Chandler quickly fired out 3,800.

This left me in a tough spot with both of the original pre-flop aggressors still to act behind me. The way Chandler bet and the previous information I had on him so far in the tournament convinced me that I had him beaten and his most likely hand was a diamond draw. I couldn’t work out a made hand that either of the early position players would want to slow-play on this flop, except a set of eights or nines and even this would be a very dangerous play. I called the 3,800 and hoped both the other players would pass. I could then push all-in on any blank turn and force Chandler to a decision. UTG passed and Andrew passed (very reluctantly, claiming later to have the other two tens). The turn was the ultimate blank, the 2s. I pushed all-in and Chandler quickly called, tabling pocket Queens.

On the face of it, I called pre-flop to hit a ten, didn’t hit one and still went broke. However, this is a bit too simplistic. The reason I only called pre-flop wasn’t because I was worried Chandler was slow-playing a big hand on the button. My assumptions were that he would not want to slow-play a big pair given the action that had already happened, and the distinct chance of a multi-way pot if he just flat-called. While it is true that Jacks are in his range this is about the only pre-flop hand that I could give him credit for that I am losing to. The physical information I was able to take from his bet suggested that he had not flopped a set and so in my eyes his range was skewed towards his drawing hands. I was trapped between Chandler and the two pre-flop aggressors. Their post-flop actions suggested they had missed although of course a trap was possible. It was for this reason that I preferred the stop-and-go move to just moving all-in on the flop.

This would also allow me to get my money in as a significant favourite on a blank turn card. The fact that Andrew took so long to pass his tens shows that he had the same read of the situation as I did, but he now had two opponents who had put chips in on this flop to worry about and elected to fold. I’m quite happy with my play even though my opponent turned over a better hand. Weirdly, if Chandler hadn’t called on the button I likely wouldn’t even have called with my tens as the odds to flop a set aren’t compelling (especially given that I’m not closing the action) unless it’s very likely to be a multi-way pot.